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"A treaty does not create either obligations'or
rightsfor a thirdState without its consent."I

International law can be defined as "the system of rules, principles,
and processes intended to govern relations at the interstate level''
including the relations among states, organizations, and individuals."
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lists
three primary and several secondary sources of international law. The
I. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 34 simply incorporates the
customary law principle into the treaty. This is a common practice, and doing so does not
remove the principle from customary international law, although it does make it part of binding
conventional law for those States which are a party to the treaty which incorporates the
customary law principle. As such, those States that have acceded to the Vienna Convention are
bound by both conventional and customary law regarding that principle.
2. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (Mary Ellen
O'Connell et al. eds., 6th ed. 2010) [hereinafter O'CONNELL].
3. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT], for sources of international law:
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the
international community of states
(a) in the form of customary law;
(b) by international agreement; or
(c) by derivation from general principles common to major legal
systems of the world.
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
(3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto ....
(4) General principles common to the major legal systems ...may be
invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate.
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three primary sources are: (1) "international

3

conventions . . .

4
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states"
(commonly referred to as "conventional international law" and
generally binding on the parties to the respective convention); (2)
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law" 5 (commonly referred to as "customary international law" and
generally binding on all nations); and (3) "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." 6 Secondary sources of international
law include "judicial decisions," "teaching of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations," 7 as well as principles of equity and
fairness. 8 In this Article, we will focus primarily on the relationship and
interaction between conventional international law and customary

international law.
4. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, art. 38(l)(a) (emphasis added). Note especially the phrase,
"establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states." Such rules need not be
recognized by states which are not parties to the convention. Some jurists question whether
treaties should even be considered as a source of international law. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, for
example, has opined that "'treaties are no more a source of law than an ordinary private law
contract that creates rights and obligations .... In itself, the treaty and "the law" it contains only
applies to the parties to it."' INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 95 (Louis Henkin et

al. eds., 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter HENKIN] (quoting Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some Problems
Regarding the Formal Sources of InternationalLaw, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 153, 157-58 (Von
Asbeck, et al. eds., 1958)).
5. ICJ Statute, supranote 3, art. 38(l)(b).
The view of most international lawyers is that customary law is not a form
of tacit treaty but an independent form of law; and that, when a custom
satisfying the definition in Article 38 is established, it constitutes a general
rule of international law which, subject to one reservation, applies to every
state.
HENKIN, supra note 4, at 87. That "one reservation" applies to the State which, "while the
custom is in process of formation, unambiguously and persistently registers its objection to the
recognition of the practice as law." Id.
6. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, art. 38(l)(c); see also O'CONNELL, supra note 2, at 60.
These include common principles of law and justice reflected in the legal systems of civilized
states.
7. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, art. 38(t)(d). Louis Henkin aptly notes that
[t]he place of the writer in international law has always been more important
than in municipal legal systems. The basic systematization of international
law is largely the work of publicists, from Grotius and Gentilis onwards ....
In the [civil law] systems reference to textbook writers and commentators is
a normal practice, as the perusal of any collection of decisions of the
German, Swiss or other European Supreme Courts will show.
HENKIN,

8.

supra note 4, at 123.
HENKIN, supra note 4, at 123.
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Conventional international law is found in conventions, treaties, and
similar negotiated agreements between and among States as well as
agreements between States and other international actors (like the
United Nations or NATO), and it is binding on the parties to such
agreements. 9 Accordingly, it is a consent-based legal regime.
Customary international law, on the other hand, is law based on custom
that develops over an extended period of time and is considered binding
on all States. 10 Although it is not necessarily written law, customary
international law is nonetheless considered "law" because States
generally comply with its requirements because they believe that they
have a legal obligation to do so.II
It is a foundational principle of customary international law that a
State that has not become a party to a treaty or other international2
convention is not bound by the terms of such treaty or convention.'
Accordingly, since principles of customary international law constitute
the default provisions governing the relationship between States, they
will always supersede contrary provisions of conventional international
law as far as States not a party to the respective convention are
concerned. In other words, a non-party State to an international
convention is not bound by the terms of such convention without its
consent. As such, in general (and absent an intervening, bilateral
agreement between them that modifies custom), the relations between a
9. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith") (emphasis added).
10. There is one notable exception. A State may exempt itself from an international
custom if that State is a "persistent objector" during the period that the custom develops. Curtis
A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 211
(2010). Additionally, customary law is frequently incorporated into treaties, thereby making it
also binding as conventional law for the States Parties to the respective treaty.
11. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 77 (Feb. 20).
The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States
concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a
legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts, is not
in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of
ceremonial and protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which
are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition,
and not by any sense of legal duty.
Id. In that sense, customary international law differs from customary usage (such as ceremonial
salutes at sea or exempting diplomatic vehicles from certain parking regulations), because States
recognize no legal obligation to do the latter.
12. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 34. There can be an exception here,
too. Principles enshrined in treaties may evolve into custom over time if non-party States to the
respective treaty begin to conform their activities to such principles because they believe that
they have a legal obligation to do so. See also supra note 11.
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State Party to a convention and a non-party State to that same
convention are governed solely by customary international law.
Recognition of this principle is key when determining the legal reach of
an institution like the International Criminal Court (ICC), an institution
created pursuant to the Rome Statute,' 3 a treaty to which a significant
number of States have not acceded (such as, the United States of
America, the People's Republic of China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel,
Iran, and Egypt, to name but a few' 4 ).
The Rome Statute exists solely because its States Parties (i.e., States
that have signed and ratified the treaty) have negotiated, and agreed to
its terms.1 5 In certain circumstances, the Statute purports to permit the
ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of non-consenting, nonparty States. 16 The grant of such jurisdiction violates customary
international law. 1 7 Indeed, this issue was one of the points of
contention during the drafting of the Rome Statute, and many key State
players in the international community were uncomfortable with a treaty
which contravened international legal norms.'8
Despite the fact that the Rome Statute contains a provision that
clearly violates customary international law by subjecting nationals of
non-consenting, non-party States to the terms of a treaty to which they
have not acceded, attempts to bring nationals of such States before the
ICC for investigation and possible trial-via that very provision-are
ongoing. In 2009, for example, despite the fact that Israel is not a State
Party to the Rome Statute, the Palestinian Authority (PA) submitted a
declaration to the ICC Registrar, in which it purported to accede to the
Rome Statute pursuant to Article 12(3). 19 It did so in an effort to bring
13. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, openedfor signature July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. As of July 31, 2013, 122 States have acceded to the

Statute. Chapter XVII1, U.N. Treaty Collection, available at http://treaties.un.org/pagesNiew
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XVIII-10&chapter= 18&lang=en#11

(last visited July

31, 2013).
14.

See

States

Parties

to

the

Rome

Statute,

available at http://www.icc-cpi.

int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20st
atute.aspx (last visited July 22, 2013). Note that among the non-acceding States are the four
most populous States in the world (i.e., China, India, the United States, and Indonesia). Cent.
Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: Population, The World FactBook (July 31, 2013),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html. As such,
approximately one-half of the world's population lives in countries that have rejected the Rome
Statute and ICC jurisdiction. Note, further, that many States in volatile regions of the world have
also declined to accede to the Statute (e.g., Israel, Iran, Egypt, and Pakistan).
15. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 13.
16. Id. art. 12(2)(a).
17. See generally David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal
Court,93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1999).
18. Id.
19. Article 12(3) permits a non-party "State" to accede to ICC jurisdiction by lodging a
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Israeli soldiers and government officials within ICC jurisdiction, inter
alia, for alleged crimes committed in the Gaza Strip during the 2008-09
Israeli military incursion known as "Operation Cast Lead., 20 More
recently, the Union of the Comoros filed a referral with the ICC
Prosecutor, requesting that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)
investigate and (ultimately) try Israeli soldiers for their alleged unlawful
actions during the 2010 boarding of the Mavi Marmara, at the time a
was attempting to breach Israel's naval
Comoros-flagged vessel, which
21
Strip.
Gaza
the
of
blockade
Irrespective of the truthfulness or falsehood of the allegations of
criminal wrongdoing in the above examples, the ICC is not the correct
forum when nationals of a non-party State to the Rome Statute, like
Israel, are involved, absent such State's express grant of its consent
thereto, consent which Israel has not granted-and is unlikely to grant.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I traces the development
of international criminal tribunals, culminating in the creation of the
ICC. Part II examines the nature of the ICC as a court of limited
jurisdiction under the Rome Statute. It also introduces the reader to
Article 12(2)(a)-the provision that explicitly grants the ICC
jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party States. Part III argues that
such jurisdiction is unlawful and that current attempts to broaden the
meaning and reach of the Rome Statute constitute an assault on
unambiguous international custom. This Article concludes with a call to
uphold the rule of law by recognizing the ICC's status as a court of
limited jurisdiction and to reject the attempt reflected in the Rome
Statute to expand its reach in violation of customary international law.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

The historical development of post-conflict tribunals to bring to
declaration with the ICC Registrar. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 12(3). The PA
attempted that, see infra note 202, even though it was not a State.
20. Ali Khashan, Minister of Justice, Palestinian Nat'l Auth., Declaration Recognizing the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
N R/rdonlyres/74EEE20 1-OFED-4481-95D4-C8071087102C/279777/20090122 Palestinian
Declaration2.pdf. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor subsequently rejected this declaration
because it recognized that the PA was not a State for purposes of the Rome Statute. Statement,
Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Situation in Palestine (Apr. 3, 2012),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.intNRfrdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A
/284387/SituationinPalestine0304l2ENG.pdf.
21. Referral of the Union of the Comoros with Respect to the 31 May 2010 Israeli Raid
on the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla Bound for Gaza Strip to the International Criminal Court (May
14, 2013), availableat http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/Referral-from-Comoros.pdf As of the
writing of this Article, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor is currently reviewing this submission.
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justice perpetrators of war crimes has not been a smooth process. Nor
has it been based on custom; what development there has been has
occurred by means of international agreements. Following the First
World War, for example, the Treaty of Versailles provided for the
establishment of ad hoc tribunals to try war criminals, 22 although no
such tribunals were formed.23 Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty
specifically called for the establishment of a tribunal composed of five
judges (one each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy,
and Japan) to try the former German Kaiser. 24 Article 227 also called
for requesting that the government of the Netherlands surrender the
Kaiser for trial. 25 Dutch officials declined to surrender the Kaiser to the
requesting powers, and no trial was ever held.2 6 This may have been
because Germany had never surrendered;2 7 instead, German officials
had agreed to an armistice 28 with the so-called Allied and Associated
Powers.
In 1920, the Advisory Committee of Jurists, which had gathered to
prepare the foundation for the Permanent Court of International Justice,
also proposed the creation of a High Court of International Justice to try
perpetrators of crimes against international public order and
22. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, arts. 22729, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter Versailles Treaty].
23. Antonio Cassese, From Nuremberg to Rome: InternationalMilitary Tribunals to the
Criminal Court, in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3, 4

(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
24. Versailles Treaty, supra note 22, art. 227. At the end of the war, the Kaiser abdicated
and was granted asylum in the Netherlands. SPENCER TUCKER & PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS,
WORLD WAR I: A STUDENT ENCYCLOPEDIA 1015 (2006).
25. Versailles Treaty, supra note 22, art. 227.
26. 2 LAMAR CECIL, WILHELM 11: EMPEROR AND EXILE, 1900-1941, at 299-300 (1996).
Historians may disagree regarding the issue of who was solely or primarily responsible for the
outbreak of the First World War. See, e.g., Hayley Dixon, Germany and Austria started WWI
Seeking EuropeanDomination,Historian Says, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/
britain-at-war/l 0110657/Germany-and-Austria-started-WWI-seeking-European-domination-hist
orian-says.html; The Causes of World War One, available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/

origins/causes.htm (referring to multiple causes); John Bourne, Total War I: The Great War,
available at http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/wwl/boumeessay.htm

(referring to multiple

causes). However, few would dispute that the German violation of Belgian neutrality was not a
war crime for which German officials could-or should-be held liable.

27. Even today, November t Ith in the United States marks "Armistice Day" (since
renamed "Veterans Day"), because the fighting in the First World War ceased on the eleventh
hour of the eleventh day in the eleventh month in 1918. History of Veterans Day, U.S. DEP'T
VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://wwwl.va.gov/opa/vetsday/vetdayhistory.asp (last visited June 21,
2013).

28.

An "armistice" is defined as "a temporary cessation of fighting by mutual consent."

See Armistice, FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/armistice (last visited June

21, 2013) (emphasis added). As such, an armistice does not indicate that one side was defeated
in the conflict.
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international law. 29 The League of Nations rejected as "premature" the
proposal for such a High Court. 30 Following the League of Nations
rejection, the idea of a standing international court to deal with
international breaches of the peace was kept alive by NGOs, but none of
their ideas came to fruition in the interwar period. States were simply
not ready to cede their sovereign prerogatives to such a court.
Following the Second World War, the international community was
reeling from the sheer magnitude of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazi
regime in Europe and by the Japanese regime in large portions of East
and South-East Asia. 32 Recalling the failure to hold war criminals
accountable following the First World War, the Allied powers resolved
not to repeat that mistake. In Spring 1945, representatives from the
United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France gathered in
London to decide how to punish Nazi war criminals. 33 The result was
the so-called Nuremberg Charter which established the International
Military Tribunal (IMT)to try high-ranking Nazis for "crimes against
peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity." 34 Each power
also prosecuted within its35respective zone of occupation lower-level
Nazis for the same crimes.
The Nuremberg trials served as a precedent and started a process that
has, by fits and starts, continued to this day. Shortly after the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the newly formed U.N. General Assembly
adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, which recognized the potential of a future "international
penal tribunal" to assist states in the punishment of genocide. 36 The
General Assembly also invited the International Law Commission (ILC)
to investigate the feasibility of creating a permanent international
tribunal with power to try individuals for international crimes, such as
genocide. 37 Accordingly, in 1951, the ILC transmitted a draft statute to
the United Nations, detailing the structure and jurisdiction of the
proposed international criminal court. 38 In 1952, the General Assembly
29. Cassese, supra note 23.
30. Id. at 5.
31.

Id.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.at6-7.
35. Id. at 7.
36. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 6, G.A.
Res. 260(llI)(A), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948).
37. G.A. Res. 260(111)(B), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(Il) (Dec. 9, 1498) ("Invites the
International Law Commission to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an
international judicial organ for the trail of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over
").
which jurisdictions will be conferred upon that organ by international conventions ....
38. Rep. of the Comm. on Int'l Criminal Jurisdiction, 1st Sess., Aug. 1-31, 1951, U.N.
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created a new committee charged with the responsibility of perfecting
the draft statute, 39 and the committee produced an updated draft for
consideration in 1953.40

Despite the multiple drafts presented to the General Assembly, the
United Nations eventually abandoned its efforts to institute an
international criminal court owing to the realities of the Cold War. Soon
after the Second World War ended, the relations among the victorious
allies deteriorated politically to the point where the world was divided
into two competing camps: the Western Bloc, led by the United States,
and the Eastern (or Soviet) Bloc, led by the Soviet Union. The resulting
division manifested itself in international organizations like the United
Nations. The U.N. Security Council, for example, which was charged
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter with the responsibility to
maintain international peace, 4 1 was rendered virtually impotent by the
East-West split. Each of the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council 42 (often called the P-5) possessed
veto power over any
•43
action being considered by the Council. As such, each bloc could
effectively check the other bloc's initiatives in the Council. Moreover,
as the sides competed for influence around the globe, armed conflicts
became more, rather than less, frequent, especially in regions where the
two blocs sought to expand their influence or control.4 Only after the
demise of the Soviet Bloc did the Security Council begin to function in
a manner more akin to that which was originally intended.
Yet, the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did
not lead to peace. The disintegration of the Soviet Bloc unleashed long
pent-up frustration and anger among various peoples and groups which
led to increasing instability in previously stable regions. For example,
the disintegration of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines led to armed
conflicts among Croats, Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Albanian Kosovars,
and others. 45 These internecine conflicts were characterized by horrific
Doc. A/2136; GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11, Annex 1 (1952).
39. G.A. Res. 687(VII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/687(VII) (Dec. 5, 1952).

40.

Rep. of the 1953 Comm. on Int'l Criminal Jurisdiction, July 27-Aug. 20, 1953, U.N.

Doc. A/2645; GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, Annex (1954).

41. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-42.
42. The P-5 consisted of the Republic of China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
and the United States. Over time, the China seat passed from the Nationalist Chinese regime on
Taiwan to the People's Republic of China on the mainland, and, with the demise of the Soviet
Union, the Soviet seat passed to the Russian Federation.
43. U.N. Charter art. 27, 3.
44. Among the conflicts were the Greek civil war, the French war in Indo-China, the
Chinese civil war, the Korean war, the Vietnam war as well as numerous colonial wars in such
disparate places as Indonesia, Algeria, and Kenya, to name but a few.
45. Ivo Banac, Bosnian Muslims: From Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood
and Post-Communist Statehood, 1918-1922, in THE MUSLIMS OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: THEIR
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atrocities. 46 It was then that the Security Council-no longer hobbled by
Cold War intrigue and competition-resolved to create an ad hoc
tribunal (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
or ICTY) to try and punish those responsible for crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.47
Similarly, in response to the genocide in Rwanda, the Security
Council created an ad hoc tribunal (the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda or ICTR) to try and punish those responsible for the
horrendous crimes that occurred in Rwanda. 48 Additionally, a U.N.backed, mixed, International-Cambodian tribunal is currently dealing
with atrocities committed by members of the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia. 49 Note that in each of the three tribunals just mentioned, the
vast majority of the crimes being handled were committed internally
(i.e., within the State involved). In other words, these "international"
tribunals are dealing essentially with crimes committed in internal
conflicts (i.e., crimes committed within the territory of a State by
nationals of that State).
As the ad hoc tribunals were being created, momentum was
gathering, once again, for the creation of a permanent international
criminal tribunal. In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago, motivated by domestic
criminal drug-trafficking beyond its ability to control, appealed to the
United Nations to move forward with creatin an international tribunal
to deal with international criminal activity. The General Assembly
responded by requesting the ILC to provide an updated version of its
HisToRIc DEVELOPMENT FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
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(Mark Pinson ed., 1996); Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the
Conflict over Kosovo's FinalStatus, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 387, 394-95 (2003).

46.

Williams, supra note 45, at 395-97.

47.

S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).

48.

S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).

49.

See G.A. Res. 57/228 B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 B (May 22, 2003).

50. Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Forty-Fourth
Session, International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities Engaged in Illicit
Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Across National Frontiers and Other Transnational Criminal
Activities: Establishment of an International Criminal Court with Jurisdiction over Such Crimes,
in letter dated Aug. 21, 1989 from the Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/44/195, Annex (Aug. 21,
1989).

The establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction to
prosecute and punish individuals and entities who engage in, inter alia, the
illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs across national borders would serve to
bolster the legal process whereby such offenders are prosecuted and
punished and would also contribute substantially to the progressive
development and codification of international law.
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5
previous draft statutes. '
In 1994, the ILC transmitted to the General Assembly a new draft
statute and recommended, inter alia, that U.N. member states convene
to negotiate a treaty establishing such a court.52 For the next four years,
various U.N. bodies discussed and amended the statute. Then, from
June 15 to July 17, 1998, 160 states gathered in Rome to negotiate a
final version of the treaty. On July 17, 1998, the conference voted to
adopt the Rome Statute,53 whose terms established the International
Criminal Court and its jurisdiction.
Ratification by 60 States was required for the treaty to take effect 5 4
The required 60th ratification came on April 11, 2002. 55 The Rome
Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002.56

II. DESPITE THE ROME STATUTE'S STATED GOAL OF ENSURING THAT
THE PERPETRATORS OF THE MOST SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
NOT GO UNPUNISHED, 57 THE ICC IS NONETHELESS A COURT OF
LIMITED JURISDICTION

The ICC is, by the Rome Statute's own terms, a court of limited, not
plenary, jurisdiction. The ICC is limited in a number of significant ways
(each of which, in some measure, works against the actual achievement
of the Statute's stated goal of ensuring that the perpetrators of the most
serious international crimes are brought to justice for their crimes 58).

Among the explicit limitations are the following:
The Rome Statute only permits "States,

59

to accede to ICC

51. G.A. Res. 44/39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/39 (Dec. 4, 1989).
52. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 45th Sess., May 3-July 23, 1993, U.N. Doc. A/48/10;
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Annex (1994).
53. 2 U.N. DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE PLENARY MEETINGS AND OF THE
MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, at 362, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. 11), U.N.

Sales No. E.02.I.5 (2002).
54.

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 126.
U.N. Treaty Collection, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XVIIl-10
&chapterI8&lang- en (last updated June 14, 2013).

55.

56. Id.
57. Rome Statute, supra note 13, pmbl.
4, 5.
58. Id.
59. The term "State," in U.N. and international practice, especially when capitalized,
refers to recognized, sovereign nation-states. See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 25/2625, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970);
Louis HENKIN,

INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS,
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jurisdiction. 60 That is why the ICC Prosecutor ultimately rejected the
2009 Declaration of6 1the Palestinian Authority (PA) attempting to accede
to ICC jurisdiction.
The Statute limits ICC jurisdiction to the finite list of crimes found
in Article 5: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and the crime of aggression. 62 The Statute further limits the
ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes to those committed as "part of a plan
63
or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes."
Finally, "the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where...
is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
[t]he case
64
Court."

The Statute limits ICC jurisdiction by time. The ICC Prosecutor, for
example, may only investigate and try crimes committed after the treaty
came into force. 65 In addition to the time limit regarding when the treaty
came into force, ICC jurisdiction may be deferred by the U.N. Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter for an indefinite
number of successive twelve-month periods. 66 Further, each State upon
EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 3-6, 11
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
60. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 12 (limiting accession to "States"); id. art.
14 (limiting referral of situations to "States"); id. art. 112 (limiting membership in Assembly of
States Parties to "States"); id. art. 125 (limiting accession to the Statute to "States"). Moreover,
Professor Otto Triffierer noted in his Commentary on the Rome Conference that, "[i]n
accordance with normal modem practice for multilateral treaties, the [ICC] Statute [was] open
for signature by all States." OTTO TRIFFTERER & KAI AMBOS, COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1287 (1999) (emphasis added). The only
exception would be a referral by the U.N. Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter of a situation to the ICC. The Security Council alone has authority to refer a non-State
entity to the ICC (as it did with respect to the Darfur region of Sudan). S.C. Res. 1593, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
61. Statement, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Situation in
Palestine (Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB94FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf.
62. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 5. Note that, with respect to the crime of aggression,

Article 121(5) gives States Parties the choice either to accept or not to
accept any amendment to Article 5. This means that a State party may
exclude the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to the crime of aggression
even when this crime should have been defined and accepted by seveneighths of the States Parties as required by Article 121(4).
Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 5; Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of
Jurisdiction,in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, at 583, 605.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8.
Id. art. 17(l)(d).
Id. art. 11. See also id. art. 8bis (regarding crime of aggression).
Id. art. 16.
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acceding to the Statute may declare that the treaty shall not apply to its
territory or nationals regarding war crimes
for up to seven years from
67
the respective State's date of accession.
The Statute permits ICC jurisdiction to be limited by a State Party's
explicit rejection of the definition of aggression, once adopted, or of
amendments to the other listed crimes. 68 Were a State Party to reject the
definition of aggression or any amendment to other listed crimes, it
would not be answerable for the crime of aggression or for the amended
crimes. In the case of rejecting amendments to already listed crimes, the
State Party would remain answerable, but only for the crimes as
originally defined in the Statute.
The Statute precludes prosecution of persons who may have
committed Article 5 crimes when under the age of eighteen.69
The Statute precludes trials in absentia.7 °
The Statute limits the admissibility of ICC prosecutions to situations
where national courts are either unwilling or unable to try and punish
perpetrators for Article 5 crimes. 71 In other words, where national courts
are willing and able to try and punish accused perpetrators, the ICC
lacks the ability to act. This reflects the concept of "complementarity."
According to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC's first Prosecutor, the
ideal situation would be for the ICC never to have to try a case.72
The Statute precludes ICC jurisdiction to try alleged Article 5
perpetrators who are not nationals of a State Party to the Statute and
who commit the crime in the territory of a non-Party State.73 This
generally reflects the consent-based nature of treaties.
As we have seen in (3) and (4) above, despite its stated goal of
ensuring that perpetrators of Article 5 crimes are to be brought to
justice, in reality, the Rome Statute permits its own States Parties to opt
out of certain provisions and obligations in certain circumstances.
67.

Id. art. 124.

68. Id. arts. 5(2) & 121(5). The definition of "aggression" was agreed to at the 2010
Kampala Review Conference in Uganda. It is to take effect in a State one year after it is adopted
by thirty States Parties and after a decision made by the required majority of States on a date
after January 1, 2017. Resolution RC/Res.6, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (June 11, 2010),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf.

69. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 26.
70. Id.art. 63.
71. Id. pmbl. 10; id. art. 1.
72.

See Global Leaders-Luis Moreno Ocampo, INT'L BAR ASS'N (Jan. 2, 2013),

http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=81213dcf-0911-4141 -ad29-486f9b03d37.
73. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 12 (expressly delineating when the ICC may
exercise jurisdiction, which does not include third-party nationals committing Article 5 crimes
on third-party States' territory); see also Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of
Jurisdiction,in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 23,
at 583, 612.
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Hence, application of the Statute's terms may vary even among States
Parties.
It is important to keep in mind the jurisdictional exemptions that the

Rome Statute reserves to its own States Parties, especially since the
Rome Statute claims the right of the ICC to investigate and try nationals

of non-party States in certain circumstances. Specifically, Article
12(2)(a)

permits

the ICC to exercise jurisdiction

over alleged

perpetrators of Article 5 crimes committed on the territory of a State
Party, irrespective of the nationality of the accused. 74 That means that
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States may be hauled before the
ICC. Yet, the Rome Statute allows nationals of its own States Parties to
evade ICC jurisdiction in repeated instances 75 while simultaneously
claiming the right of the ICC to try non-party State nationals for such

crimes. In other words, under the Rome Statute, accused nationals of a
State that has rejected the Rome Statute altogether may have fewer
rights and protections than the nationals of States that agreed to be
bound by the Statute in the first place. 76 That is a perverse and wholly
unreasonable result. It is also wholly unlawful under customary
international law and, hence, ultra vires.

74.

Article 12(2) of the Rome Statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
2. In the case of article 13 [deals with Exercise of Jurisdiction], paragraph
(a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the
following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction
of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred
or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of
registration of that vessel or aircraft ....

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 12(2)(a). Note that Article 12(2)(a) applies irrespective of the
nationality of the perpetrator of the crime. Accordingly, nationals of non-party States are subject
to ICC prosecution according to the Rome Statute. Note further that a non-party State may
accede to ICC jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(3).
75. Such as by allowing newly acceding States to defer ICC jurisdiction over their
nationals and territories for war crimes for up to seven years. Id. art. 124. As well as, allowing
States Parties to reject the definition of aggression (once adopted) or future amendments to other
listed crimes. Id. art. 121(5). None of this is allowed to non-consenting, non-party States.
76. JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31437, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 13 n.68 (2002) [hereinafter CRS REPORT]
(noting that the ICC appears to have broader jurisdiction over war crimes committed by non-

party nationals than by nationals of States Parties to the Statute).
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III. ARTICLE 12(2)(A) OF THE ROME STATUTE PURPORTING TO
ASSERT ICC JURISDICTION OVER THE NATIONALS OF NONCONSENTING, NON-PARTY STATES DEFIES INTERNATIONAL LAW

In this part we will argue that the incorporation of Article 12(2)(a)
into the Rome Statute stands in defiance of international law, at least as
it concerns the nationals of non-consenting, non-party States. In support
of this contention, we offer the following three points: First, Article
12(2)(a) disregards the well-established principle in customary
international law requiring a State's consent in order for a treaty to bind
that State or its nationals. Second, other international tribunals
recognize and have affirmed the consent-based nature of international
law. Third, asserting the existence of "universal jurisdiction" over
Article 5 crimes does not automatically or necessarily mean that the
ICC, a court created by only a portion of the world community, may
exercise lawful jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-consenting, nonparty State from the world community at large.
A. Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute Constitutes a Legal Overreach
Which Violates Customary InternationalLaw and is, Therefore, Ultra
Vires and Void
When the government of a State exercises its sovereign will
regarding the acceptance or rejection of a convention or treaty, the
officials of that State are, in fact, acting as agents on behalf of that
State's population, its nationals. 77 We must recognize, for example, that
the territorial entities we call "Nigeria" or "Jordan" or "Canada" do
not-and, indeed, cannot-"do" anything. Only people from such
entities-to wit, "Nigerians" and "Jordanians" and "Canadians"-can
act.
Further, we cannot haul "Nigeria" or "Jordan" or "Canada" before
the bar of any court; we can only haul "Nigerians" and "Jordanians" and
"Canadians" before such a court. Accordingly, when we say that the
State of Israel or the United States of America or the People's Republic
of China "refuses to accede" to a treaty like the Rome Statute, what we
77. The Rome Statute claims the right to subject the nationals of third-party States who
commit (or are alleged to have committed) Article 5 crimes in the territory of a State Party to the
Rome Statute to investigation and/or trial by the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 12(2)(a).
Yet, such a claim violates the right of that individual as determined by his State of nationality
not to be transferred to and tried by a Court whose jurisdiction was created pursuant to a
convention that his State of nationality rejected. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 34.
That does not mean that such an individual is not subject to investigation and trial; he may be
investigated and tried by the courts of the State on whose territory he allegedly committed the
crime. What is prohibited is his being turned over to a Court created by a treaty to which his
State of nationality has refused to accede and, hence, does not recognize.
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really mean is that actual persons-the leaders of those States acting on
behalf of their respective nationals-are refusing to place their
respective "States" (meaning their respective nationals and territories)
under the authority of, or within the jurisdiction of a court created
pursuant to, such treaty. Thus, when international law states that "[a]
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State
without its consent,, 78 it is, in reality, referring to obligations and rights
on the part of the third State's nationals.
To paraphrase, "[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights
for the nationals of a third-party State without the consent of that State
as embodied by its authorizedrepresentatives."In truth, all actual actors
in international law are real persons, 79 and all decisions in international
law affect real persons. Hence, when it is asserted that the purpose of
the ICC is to punish "individuals" not "States," 80 although that is a
literally true statement, it is, in a sense, a meaningless statement, since it
is impossible to punish "States"8 as such. One can only punish individual
persons in or from such States. '
When "States" (meaning the authorized representatives of the people
in those States) get together to negotiate a treaty, they are free to modify
the application of customary international law principles amongst
themselves as they see fit pertaining to their respective nationals and
territories. This constitutes agreement based on mutual consent. Yet,
such an agreement to modify customary international law amongst the
States Parties to a treaty like the Rome Statute does not, and indeed
cannot, change the law that applies to "States" (meaning nationals and
territories of such States) that choose not to accede to the treaty. Such
an imposition is not consent-based. In the final analysis, a principle of
customary international law takes precedence over a contrary principle
contained in a treaty with respect to those States (meaning their
78. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 34 (emphasis added). Article 34 simply
incorporates the customary law principle into the treaty. This is a common practice, and doing
so does not remove the principle from customary international law, although it does make it part
of binding conventional law for those States which are a party to the treaty which incorporates
the customary law principle.
79. Even corporations, which enjoy legal "personality" and possess "nationality," act
through real persons (to wit, their corporate officers and boards of directors), and, if "punished,"
it is real persons who pay the penalty (i.e., officers, directors, and shareholders).
80. See, e.g., CRS REPORT, supra note 73, at 5.
81. For example, the sanctions regime aimed at "Iran" actually targets and punishes, not
only the Iranian officials who may have been designated by name, but all other Iranians as well,
irrespective of their roles and responsibilities for the Iranian nuclear program. The same is true
of the U.S. sanctions regime against "Cuba"; it is individual Cubans who suffer as a result of the
sanctions, not the entity "Cuba" per se. Hence, the "individual-versus-State" argument is, in
reality, a contrived argument that seeks to sidestep the inconvenient strictures of contrary
customary law.
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respective nationals and territories) that are not parties to that treaty.
Hence, the fact that States Parties to the Rome Statute have agreed
amongst themselves that the ICC shall have jurisdiction over the
nationals of non-party States who are alleged to have committed an
Article 5 crime on the soil of a State Party 82 does not-and lawfully
cannot-override the non-party State's rights under customary
international law not to be bound in any way by the terms of a treaty to
which it is not a party. 83 Accordingly, if no individual State or group of
like-minded States can lawfully compel a third-party State to be bound
by terms of a treaty to which the latter has not acceded, neither may a
subordinate creation of such individual State or group of States (such as
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) or the ICC) lawfully do so.
Each State Party to the Rome Statute has freely yielded part of its
national sovereignty to the ICC, a specific creation of that treaty. As
such, officials at the ICC-not a sovereign entity itself-have authority
to compel the States Parties, all of which are sovereign entities, to yield
to the will of the ICC in certain circumstances as laid out in the Rome
Statute. ICC officials have no such authority in relation to non84
consenting, non-party States (meaning their nationals and territories),
this in spite of what the Rome Statute may say, because States Parties to
the Rome Statute lack the authority themselves to encroach upon the
rights of non-party States vis-6-vis the nationals and territories of those
States. 85 That the Rome Statute purports to grant such authority86 is a
legal overreach in violation of customary international law. Such
overreach is both ultra vires and void ab initio.
Accordingly, notwithstanding explicit language to the contrary in the
Rome Statute, neither the ICC Prosecutor nor any ICC judge has any
lawful authority to violate customary international law by asserting
authority over a non-party State's nationals. As such, neither the ICC
Prosecutor nor any ICC judge may lawfully apply the provision of the
Rome Statute (to wit, Article 12(2)(a)) that purports to compel nationals
of non-consenting, non-party States to submit to ICC jurisdiction for
alleged Article 5 crimes committed on the soil of a State Party to the

82. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 12(2)(a).
83. Once again, that does not mean that the third-party national may not be tried for the
alleged offense. He may be tried in the courts of the State in which the alleged crime took place,
pursuant to that State's law and legal procedures. What customary international law prohibits is
the transfer ofjurisdiction over the accused to the ICC, a court created by a treaty to which the
non-consenting, third-party State has not acceded.
84. See, e.g., CRS REPORT, supra note 73, at 21 n. 111 (noting that State practice does not
support the assertion that universal jurisdiction over war crimes has reached the level of
customary law binding all States).
85.

See supra note 75.

86. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 12(2)(a).
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Rome Statute. 87 Were either to do so, he or she would be acting in clear
violation of customary international law. In truth, such a decision would
undermine the rule of law-ironically, the very value they would be
claiming to uphold.
B. OtherInternationalCourts Recognize and Have Affirmed the
Consent-BasedLimitation to Their Jurisdiction Under Customary
InternationalLaw
The principle of customary international law that "[a]n international
agreement does not create either obligations or rights for a third-party
state without its consent" 8 8 is well-established and has been recognized
by other international courts. In fact, this principle has been expanded
upon by international tribunals.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example,
specifically requires that parties consent to its jurisdiction before the ICJ
will adjudicate a matter. The ICJ's case law has affirmed this principle
throughout its history. The first time the ICJ had cause to make such a
determination came in the 1954 case, Monetary Gold Removed from
Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and United States of America) (Monetary Gold).90
That case centered around an incident that occurred in 1943, in the
midst of World War II, when the German Army removed a large
amount of gold from Rome. 9 1 When the war ended, both Albania and
Italy claimed
the gold and submitted competing claims to international
92
arbitration.
While waiting for the outcome of the arbitration proceeding, the
governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
signed an agreement to hold the gold in escrow in the United Kingdom
so that it could retain the gold "in partial satisfaction of the [j]udgment
87. Even when the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
refers a situation concerning a non-party State's nationals to the ICC Prosecutor, the Council is
acting under its authority as found in the U.N. Charter, not on any article found in the Rome
Statute, because the Council (as a non-State entity) is not-and cannot be-a party to the Rome
Statute. Further, compliance by the third-party State is based on its being a party to the U.N.
Charter (which obligates it to obey certain Security Council decisions), not on any obligation
that it owes to the Rome Statute or any right claimed by ICC officials. When the Security
Council refers a situation to the ICC Prosecutor regarding a non-party State to the Rome Statute,
the Council is, in effect, incorporating by reference the appropriate provisions of the Rome
Statute into its decision, thereby obligating the U.N. Member State to comply with those
provisions.
88. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 34; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324(1).
89. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, arts. 34(1), 36(2)-(3).
90.
91.

Monetary Gold Case (It. v. Fr., U.K., & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19 (15 June).
Id. at 19.

92. Id.
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in the Corfu Channel case" 93 in the event that the gold was found to

belong to Albania. After the arbitrator found in favor of Albania, Italy
filed an action with the ICJ against France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. In its application, Italy argued (1) that France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States should deliver the gold to Italy,
and (2) that its right to the gold superseded the United Kingdom's right
to partial94satisfaction of damages sustained during the Corfu Channel
incident.

Before proceeding to the merits of Italy's first claim, the ICJ stated
that it "must [first] examine whether ...

jurisdiction [conferred by

Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States] is [co]extensive with the task entrusted to it." 95 However, integral to this
dispute was the claim of Albania-an unnamed party-to the gold.
Indeed, the ICJ stated that, "[i]n order.., to determine whether Italy is
entitled to receive the gold, it is necessary to determine whether Albania
has committed any international wrong against Italy, and whether she is
under an obligation to pay compensation to [Italy][;] and, if so, to
determine also the amount of compensation." 96 Therefore, the ICJ held
97
that it "cannot decide such a dispute without the consent of Albania."
The ICJ's explanation of that ruling is particularly telling: "To
adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania without her
consent would run counter to a well-established principle of
internationallaw embodied in the [ICJ's] Statute, namely, that the [ICJ]
can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent." 98 That wellestablished principle remains a vital part of customary international law
to this day.
In a more recent case concerning East Timor, the ICJ once again
applied the principle that an international tribunal cannot decide a case
99
involving the legal rights of a third party without that party's consent.
In 1989, Australia, believing that the island of East Timor was under
Indonesian control, signed a treaty with Indonesia regarding use of East
Timor's continental shelf. 00 Yet, Portugal, which had controlled East
Timor exclusively from the sixteenth century until 1975,101 claimed that

93. Id. at 21.
94. Id. at 22. The ICJ found that a provision in the agreement signed by France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States amounted to acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction; therefore, it
had been duly authorized by all named parties to adjudicate the matter. See id. at 31.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 32.
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (30 June).
100. Id. at 101-02.
101. See id. at 95-96.
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any treaty executed without its consent was invalid. 0 2 Thus, "the
fundamental question in the ...case [wa]s ultimately whether, in 1989,
the power to conclude a treaty on behalf of East Timor in relation to its
continental shelf lay with Portugal or with Indonesia."' 0 3 Like the
Monetary Gold case, in which the ICJ refused to make a legal
determination that would affect the legal rights of a non-consenting
third party (Albania), the ICJ in the East Timor case refused to rule
because Indonesia had not accepted its jurisdiction.' 0 4 It further refined
the Monetary Gold standard by stating that the necessity of determining
third-party rights did not necessarily preclude it from exercising
jurisdiction. 105However,
when
a
State's
"rights
and
obligations.., constitute the very subject-matter of ...a judgm
ent,"
the
10 6
consent.
State's
that
without
jurisdiction
exercise
ICJ may not
The ICJ is not the only international tribunal that has upheld the
Monetary Gold principle. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in
The Hague, The Netherlands, applied this principle in its 2001 decision,
Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom. ° 7 In that case, Larsen refused to pay
fines associated with traffic citations.10 8 Instead of registering his
automobile as required by state law, Larsen argued that as a citizen of
the Hawaiian Kingdom, he was not subject to U.S. law' 0 9 and that
Hawaii was in violation of its obligations under an 1849 treaty between
the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States by allowing U.S.
municipal law to govern." 0o The PCA held that because the interests of
the United States were "a necessary foundation for the decision between
the parties," it could not rule on the dispute at hand."'1 Moreover, even
though both parties to the arbitration proceeding argued that the
Monetary Gold principle should apply only to ICJ proceedings, the PCA
held that the principle must be applied by all international tribunals,
stating that,
[a]lthough

there

102.

Id. at 94-95.

103.
104.

Id. at 102.
Id. at 105.

is no doctrine

of binding

precedent

in

105. Id. at 104.
106. Id. at 105. Such would be the case with Israel concerning both Operation Cast Lead
and the enforcement of the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, because both matters implicate
Israel's inherent right to self-defense in a situation of armed conflict.
107. Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, Award, 119 I.L.R. 594 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001)
[hereinafter Award], available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/filesALHKAward.PDF.
108. Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, Memorial of Lance Paul Larsen, paras. 48-52 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2000), available at http://www.alohaquest.com/arbitration/memorial-larsen.htm.
109. Id.para. 47.
110. Award, supra note 107, para. 2.3.
111. Id. para. 11.23.
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international law, it is only in the most compelling circumstances

that a tribunal charged with the application of international law
and governed by that law should depart from a principle laid
down in a long line of decisions of the International Court of
Justice." 2
Indeed, "[t]he principle of consent in international law would be
violated if [the PCA] were to make a decision at the core of which was a
determination of the legality or illegality of the conduct of a nonparty." 113 The ICC, as an international tribunal bound by international
law, should likewise refrain from invoking jurisdiction to determine the
relative rights of nationals of non-consenting, non-party States.
As in East Timor and Larsen v. HawaiianKingdom, where the ICJ
and PCA, respectively, refused to exercise jurisdiction because thirdparty rights constituted the very subject matter of the proceedings, the
ICC should refuse to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of nonconsenting, non-party States. Such action would directly contravene the
well-established customary international legal principle articulated in
Monetary Gold and subsequently-both in the ICJ and in other
international tribunals-that an international tribunal may not determine
the legal rights of a third-party State without its consent if such rights go
to the very subject matter of the proceedings. Because the ICC is an
international tribunal akin to the ICJ and the PCA, the ICC should be
bound by the Monetary Gold principle in accordance with customary
international law. In short, absent a referral by the U.N. Security
Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the ICC must decline to
exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States.
C. Asserting the Existence of "UniversalJurisdiction" Over Article 5
Crimes Does Not Automatically or Necessarily Require that Nationals
of a Non-Consenting,Non-Party State Submit to ICCJurisdiction
Some argue that the ICC may investigate and try nationals of nonconsenting, non-party States under the principle of universality."l 4 That
112. Id.para.11.21.
113. Id. para. 11.20 (emphasis added).
114. See, e.g., Dapo Akanda, The Jurisdictionof the International Court over Nationalsof
Non-Parties:Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 618 (2003) (arguing that "it would

be extraordinary and incoherent if the rule permitting prosecution of crimes against the
[world's] collective interest by individual states ... simultaneously prevented those states from
acting collectively in the prosecution of these crimes" and further that collective action "should
be encouraged"). There is nothing wrong with encouraging collective action against such
crimes. States Parties to the Rome Statute are free, amongst themselves, to resort to the ICC as
they see fit. Further, other States that agree with what the Rome Statute provides are free to
accede to the Statute and accept its terms. Where Akanda and other proponents of the ICC go
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argument is built upon a number of assumptions. For example, "[t]he
universality approach starts from the assumption that, under current
international law, all States may exercise universal jurisdiction over
these core crimes [i.e., Article 5 crimes]."' 15 The first assumption is
followed by the argument "that States must be entitled to do collectively
what they have the power to do individually."" 6 From these statements,
the argument continues as follows:
Therefore, States may agree to confer this individual power on a
judicial entity they have established and sustain together and
which acts on their behalf. Thus a State which becomes a party to
the Statute thereby accepts jurisdiction with respect to the
international core crimes. As a consequence, no particular
State-be it State Party or non-State Party-mustgive its specific
consent to the exercise of this jurisdiction in a given case. This,
in essence, is the regime that follows from an approach based on
the principle of universal jurisdiction. 117
The first two sentences above are legally correct. The portion of the
foregoing quotation in italics is only partly correct vis-6-vis non-party
States. While it is true that a non-party State need not give its consent to
the exercise of jurisdiction in some cases (to wit, cases having nothing
whatsoever to do with the non-party State), it is not true with respect to
a case involving that State's nationals or other interests. Under
customary international law, a non-universal treaty (i.e., a treaty to
which only part of the international community has acceded) that
creates a court that claims universal jurisdiction over a host of offenses
does not, and cannot, bind a non-consenting, non-party State." 8 To
astray is by attempting to force-contrary to Customary International Law-the terms of the
Rome Statute on States that do not agree with its terms as is their sovereign right under
international law.
115. Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in I THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 23, at 583, 587. But see CRS

supra note 73, at 21 n. 111 (noting that State practice does not support the assertion that
universal jurisdiction over war crimes has reached the level of customary law binding all
States).
116. Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in I THE ROME
REPORT,

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 23, at 583, 587. The assertion

that States may do collectively what each may do individually is reasonable as far as it goes. A
problem arises when that assertion is stretched to mean that mutual agreement amongst a certain
group of States can obligate non-consenting States outside that group. Such an assertion violates
the sovereign rights of the States not a party to the agreement. As such, mutual agreement
amongst a number of States does not affect in any way the rights of States not a party to such
agreement.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See Vienna Convention, supra note ], art. 34.
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assert otherwise is simply not true logically or legally. Moreover, even
if one were to accept the fact that "all States may exercise universal
jurisdiction" over certain crimes, that does not automatically---or
necessarily-mean that one must also agree that a non-consenting, nonparty State has no say about whether its nationals have to submit to a
court like the ICC, a court agreed to and established in a treaty
negotiated by other States. That is simply a non-sequitur. Such "other
States" have no authority to decide such matters for a non-party State.
Universal jurisdiction does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States are triable by a court
created pursuant to an international treaty like the Rome Statute. The
inherent sovereignty of the non-consenting, non-party State takes
precedence over other States' grant of authority to such a court. In short,
a non-sovereign entity like the ICC has no lawful authority to assert
jurisdiction over nationals of a non-consenting, non-party, sovereign
State.

CONCLUSION

The stated goals of the Rome Statute are laudable. Ensuring that
perpetrators of the most serious international crimes do not go
unpunished is clearly a worthy goal. Ending impunity for such
perpetrators is unquestionably a goal worth pursuing. Those are all
goals with which people of good will can agree. However, consistent
with the rule of law and in the interest of justice, one must use lawful
means to achieve such ends.
Customary international law governs all States, whereas
conventional international law governs only those States that have
acceded thereto. The Rome Statute contains a provision, to wit, Article
12(2)(a), that can ensnare in the ICC's jurisdictional web nationals of
non-consenting, non-party States. That is a clear violation of customary
international law which recognizes that third-party "States" (by which
we mean nationals and territories of such States) are not-and cannot
be-bound, absent their consent, by the terms of a treaty to which such
States have not acceded. Accordingly, the offending provision in the
Rome Statute is ultra vires and legally unenforceable with respect to the
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States. Any application of
Article 12(2)(a) against nationals of such States by either the ICC
Prosecutor or any ICC judge would violate the rights of those States
under customary international law and be unlawful, absent prior consent
by appropriate authorities of such States.
The rule of law is the bedrock principle which underlies civilized
society. It is too important a principle to compromise because, once
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compromised, it is difficult to regain the trust that was lost. In the final
analysis, even the most desirable ends do not justify unlawful means to
achieve them. The Rome Statute created a court of limited jurisdiction.
Such limitations must be acknowledged and respected. The Rome
Statute also includes a provision that unlawfully extends the ICC's
jurisdiction to reach nationals of non-consenting, non-party States in
clear and direct violation of customary international law. Such a
provision must be acknowledged as violating customary international
law and be rejected as ultra vires and void ab initio vis-i-vis the
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States to the Rome Statute. ICC
jurisdiction may not reach nationals of non-consenting, non-party States
without the express consent of such States. To exert such jurisdiction
without proper consent would be a lawless act in clear violation of an
unambiguous principle of international law.
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